AI red teaming methodology and tooling covers the practical decisions a security team makes when adversarially testing a generative AI system: how much access to grant the testers, how much of the probing to automate, which framework or dataset to run, and how to score and report what gets found. It matters because generative AI systems fail in ways ordinary software doesn't — the same input can produce different outputs from one run to the next, and a single system can carry both security risk (injection, extraction, tool misuse) and responsible-AI risk (unsafe or biased content) at once, so a normal pentest checklist alone won't catch what's actually wrong. The mental model worth keeping is that automation buys breadth (thousands of adversarial prompts scored in hours) while human testers buy depth (the novel failure mode nobody thought to script for) — nearly every mature program, from Microsoft's AI Red Team to OpenAI's and Anthropic's, treats the two as complementary rather than one replacing the other.
What This Cheat Sheet Covers
This topic spans 11 focused tables and 59 indexed concepts. Below is a complete table-by-table outline of this topic, spanning foundational concepts through advanced details.
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Table 1: Testing Access Models — Black-Box, White-Box, and Grey-Box Testing
Before writing a single adversarial prompt, a red team decides how much visibility into the target it will have, and that choice determines which attacks are even possible. These map onto classic penetration-testing terminology but carry AI-specific implications for what "access" actually unlocks.
| Approach | Example | Description |
|---|---|---|
Only the chat endpoint is reachable; no system prompt, weights, or architecture are visible to the tester. | Treats the model as a closed system and observes only inputs and outputs; most representative of how a real external attacker interacts with a deployed AI app. | |
Full access to model weights enables a gradient-based search for an adversarial suffix (GCG). | Full visibility into architecture, weights, and training data unlocks powerful but slow, model-specific attacks; impractical against most closed APIs. |