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My MCP server holds one login to a real API on behalf of every user, with no check stopping it handing that access to the wrong one.
What you'll have at the end
A token minted for your own server, rejected the moment a downstream service tries to reuse it
You need
An MCP server already reachable over HTTP that acts as its own client-registration endpoint and forwards user logins to a downstream identity provider that doesn't support Dynamic Client Registration, holding one fixed credential to that provider on behalf of every user.
Not covered
Migrating the downstream identity provider to real Dynamic Client Registration, which would remove the need for any of this work.
Leans on
Move a stdio MCP server onto HTTP
Everything here assumes the server already answers over HTTP as its own OAuth client; get it off a local subprocess first if it still runs that way.
Vet a third-party MCP server for tool poisoning first
When the untrusted server is someone else's, not the one you host and are hardening here, vetting it before connecting matters more than fixing your own consent flow.
Checked 15 Aug 2026
Part of the MCP Servers Implementation cookbook